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THE PHYSICAL ELEMENT OF CRIME
*W. H. HITCHLER
A crime is composed of two elements:
(1) a particular physical condition.
(2) a particular mental condition.'
The former is a material and objective condition, and is usually called the
actus reus or criminal act. The latter is a formal and subjective condition, and
is usually, but inaccurately, called the criminal intent or mens rea.
The theory underlying this principle as to the composition of a crime is
said to be that before punishing for a crime the law must be satisfied of two
things :
(1) That an act has been done which by reason of its harmful re-
sults or tendencies should be repressed by criminal punish-
ment.
(2) That the mental attitude of the actor was such as to render
punishment deserved and effective.
2
THE NECESSITY FOR AN ACT
The maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea has been said to be "the
fundamental maxim of the criminal law,"' but it is just as true and just as im-
portant to say "non est reus nisi corpus sit reum," as it is to say "non est reus
nisi mens tea."'
The principle that every crime includes a physical element seems always
to have been recognized both in England and in the United States. "The
imagination of the mind to do wrong without an act is not punishable in our
law" is the pronouncement of the English court in a famous case;6 and in a
-B.L., University of Virginia Law School, 1905; D.C.L., Dickinson College, 1932; LL.D.,
St. Francis College, 1932; Professor Dickinson School of Law, 1906--; Dean of Dickinson
School of Law, 1930-.
1"To put a party in the predicament of guilt there must be (a) some act, forbearance or
omission referable to (b) the party's state of mind." Hibbert, Jurisprudence, p. 259. "In
all crimes the definition consists of two parts,-thc outward act and the state of mind which
accompanies it." Mercier. Criminal Responsibilitv. p. 3. "'To make a complete crime cogniz-
able by human laws there must be both a will and an act." Blackstone. vol. 4, p. 20. See
Cook, Yale Law Journal, vol. 26, p. 646; Kenny, Criminal Law, 11 th ed., p. 37.
2Salmond, Jurisprudence. 7th ed., pp. 380, 290; Kenny, Criminal Law, I Ith ed., p. 8; Sayre,
Harvard Law Review, vol. 35, p. 976; Holmes, Common Law, p. 49.
$Brown v. State, 23 Del. 159, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 66.
'Stephen, General View of Criminal Law, p. 74.
5Hales v. Petit, Plow. 259.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
comparatively recent American case the court declares, "With mere guilty in-
tention unconnected with an overt act * * * * the law has no concern. '
It has been asserted by various writers that in the early days of the com-
mon law, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, criminal liability could
be predicated upon mere intention. This doctrine, it is said, as expressed in
the Year Books, was voluntas pro facto reputabitur., The authorities assert-
ing this view, when traced to their sources, resolve themselves into mere
memories of former cases recited in dicta, and furnish slender support for the
doctrine for which they are cited. None of the cases proves that there ever
was a time when criminal liability could be based on mere intention; there
probably never was a time when it could be; and that it could not be was con-
clusively established in the sixteenth century. 8
DIVINE LAW AND ETHICS
In requiring a physical act as a condition of liability the criminal law
differs from the Divine Law. The Decalogue commands, "Thou shalt not
covet, "9 as well as, "Thou shalt not steal;" and in the most famous of all
sermons we are informed, "Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her
hath committed adultery with her already in his heart." 1  It also differs from
principles of ethics or moral philosophy, by which the mental element is suffi-
cient to constitute guilt. Morality is internal. The moral law has to be ex-
pressed in the form, "Be this," and not in the form, "Do this.""
Samuel Johnson, who had thought much upon the subject of acting, once
said to Kemble, "Are you, Sir, one of those who believe yourself transformed
6Ex parte Smith, 135 Mo. 223. "It is contrary to the general principle of the common
law that a mere intention to violate the law not followed by an actual violation should be a
crime." Sherman v. I. S,, 10 Fed. (2d) 17. "An intent to commit a crime is not indictable."
Proctor v. State, 15 Okla. 338, 176 Pac. 771; Com. v. McGregor, 6 Pa. D. R. 345; Smith v.
Blackley, 188 Pa. 206; "The law takes no cognizance of an intent existing only in the mind."
Com. v. Randolph, 146 Pa. 94.
TCoke, Third Institute, p. 99; Staunford, Pleas of the Crown, p. 27. See Potter, Eng-
lish Law, p. 307.
8Sayre, Harvard Law Review, vol. 41, p. 822, vol. 45, p. 991; Stephen, History of Crim-
inal Law, vol. 2, p. 222; Holdsworth, History of English Law. vol. 8, p. 433. The doctrine, if
it ever existed, was but a "momentary aberration." Pollock and Maitland, History of Eng-
lish Law, vol. 2. p. 477.
9A legislature might make covetousness criminal but the law would be inoperative unless
an external test of covetousness were assigned by more or less arbitrary definition; and then
the real subject matter of the law would be not the possession of covetousness but the behavior
defined as evincing it. Pollock, Harvard Law Review, vol. 9, p. 303.
10"The men of old time had forbidden adultery; the new moral legislator forbids lust."
Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 148.
"Stephen, The Science of Ethics, p. 148. "But no teacher of morality should tell men that
it is just as bad to wish an evil thing as to do it." Hamilton, Studies in Moral Science, p. 76.
Blackstone says, "In toro conscientiae a fixed design or will to do anl unlawful act is almost as
heinous as the commission of it." Vol. 4, p. 20.
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into the very character you represent?" Kemble replied that he had never
felt so strong a persuasion himself. "To be sure not," said Johnson, "The
thing is impossible." And then, speaking as a moral philosopher, he added,
"If Garrick really believed himself to be that monster, Richard the Third, he
deserved to be hanged everytime he performed it.""
COMMON LAW CRIMES
The requirement of a physical condition as an essential element of crim-
inal liability is applicable to all common law crimes. "The law will not take
notice of an intent without an act," 1 correctly states the rule of the common
law. 4  It is sometimes stated that conspiracy is an exception to this rule,"5
but this is incorrect." Conspiracy is not the mere concurrence of the inten-
tions of two or more persons but the announcement and acceptance of such
intentions. Bodily movement by word or gesture is necessary to effect it."r
"The very plot is an act in itself."'"
STATUTORY CRIMES
The requirement is also applicable to statutory crimes. Here also, it is
declared "that a person's intentions alone violate no law." 19 In England,
Parliament is omnipotent, and its power to define and punish crimes is ab-
solute.2° It would seem therefore that Parliament has the power to make a
mere mental condition criminal. This power has apparently not been exercised,
even if it exists. An exception appears to exist in that form of treason called
"compassing the King's death." But this exception is only an apparent one,
for the statute makes it essential to a conviction that some overt act should
have been committed toward accomplishing the end contemplated."1
12Boswell's Johnson. The necessity for an act as an essential condition of criminality ex-
ists in other systems of criminal law. Ulpian says, "Ne cogitationia poenam nemo patitur."
',Montesquieu says, "Les lois ne se chargent de punir que les actions ex terreures." The re-
quirement "must evidently be recognized unless where the worst form of tyranny prevails."
Brooms, Legal Maxims, p. 311,
"Dugdale v. Reg., I E. 6 B. 445.
14Rex v. Higgins, 2 East 5; Rex v. Heath, Russ. & Ry. 184.
"State v. Crowley, 41 Wis. 271.
"'State v. Buchanan, 5 Harr. & J. 317.
1"Sayre, Harvard Law Review, vol. 5, p. 399.
"sAikins v. Wisconsin. 195 U. S. 194.
19People v. Martin, 102 Cal. 558. 36 Pac. 932.
212 C. J. 759.
21Kenny, Criminal Law. l1th ed., p. 38; Hibbard, Jurisprudence, p. 263. But it has been
said that the crime is defined "as consisting in intention; so that even complete execution of the
design is only evidence of the intention which constitutes the offense." Pollock, jurisprudence,
p. 161. In conspiracy, where an overt act is required by statute, it has been held that the
crime consists of both the conspiracy and the act and not of the conspiracy alone. Hyde v. U.
S., 225 U. S. 347. But see contra 12 C. J. 550.
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In the United States, the power of the legislatures of the various states
to define and punish crimes is limited by the state and federal constitutions; 22
and it has been asserted that "a criminal intent not connected with any overt
act may not be punished as a crime and any statute purporting to do so is un-
constitutional. ' '23 Such a statute, it has held, "is condemned by the due pro-
cess clause of the Constitution. ' '24 Applying this doctrine it has recently been
held that a statute providing that persons reputed to be "habitual violators"
of the law should be guilty of a crime was unconstitutional.25
REASONS FOR REQUIRING AN ACT
Various reasons have been given for the requirement:
(1) "The aim of the law is not to punish sins but to prevent certain
external results,"2 and it is our present belief that "no certain
external results can be assigned to mere mental states.
' '2 7
"The state that complains in criminal cases does not suffer
from the mere imaginings of men."
28
1
(2) "It may perhaps be doubtful whether the mental condition is
sufficiently under our control to justify legal results being based
upon it." 2  It has been asserted that "the secret counsels and
resolves of a man's mind are voluntary,30 but if they are not,
the acts which result from them should not be punished.
(3) "As no temporal tribunal can search the heart, or fathom the
intentions of the mind, otherwise than they are demonstrated
by outward actions, it therefore cannot punish for what it can-
not know."3l The judgment of the law must not only be but
appear just and can only deal with that which is capable of
proof.2
2216 C. J. p. 60.
23Yale Law Journal, vol. 30, p. 762; Brill, Criminal Law, p. 13.
24Proctor v. State, 15 Okla. 338, 176 Pac. 771.
25People v. Belcastro, 356 I1. 144, 190 N. E. 30; People v. Alterie 356 Ill. 307, 190 N. E.
305. See also Ex parte Smith. 135 Mo. 223, 36 S. W. 628, 33 L. R. A. 606.
26Com. v. Kennedy, 17 Mass. 18, 48 N. E. 770.
27Pollock, jurisprudence, p. 147.
28Proctor v. State, 15 Okla. Cr. 338, 176 Pac. 771.
20Keener, Selections on jurisprudence, p. 169.
2°Pollock, jurisprudence, p. 146.
slProctor v, State, 15 Okla. Cr. 338, 176 Pac. 771. quoting Blackstone, vol. 4. p. 20. "For
which reason in all temporal jurisdictions, an overt act or some open evidence of the intended
crime is necessary before a man is liable to punishment." Blackstone, vol. 4, p. 20.
32"The law cannot undertake to regulate the thoughts and intents of the heart. It seems
unreasonable that the law should be required to detect and punish the criminal intent," Smith
v. Com.. 54 Pa. 209. "Human agencies are not yet arrived at such a degree of perfection as to
be able without some act done to discern and to determine by what intent or purpose the
human heart is actuated." Ex parte Smith, 135 Mo. 223.
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ELEMENTS OF AN ACT
An act is composed of three distinct factors or constituent parts:
(1) Its origin in some bodily activity or passivity of the actor;
(2) Its circumstances;
(3) Its consequences.-
For example, suppose A kills B by shooting him with a pistol. The factors
or constituent parts of the act are :
(1) Its origin-a series of muscular contractions by which A's arm
is raised and his finger crooked.
(2) Its circumstances-the fact that A has a pistol in his hand, that
it is loaded, that B is in range and in the line of fire.
(3) Its consequences-that the pistol is raised and pointed, in B's
direction, that the trigger is pulled and the hammer falls, that
the powder explodes, that the bullet is expelled and goes
through the air and strikes and penetrates the body of B, that
B's body undergoes physical changes which produce death. A
similar analysis may be made of all acts for which a man may
be held criminally responsible.
4
By some writers the term "act" is confined to that part of the act which
we have described as its origin. According to these authorities the circum-
stances and consequences are not regarded as part of the act but as wholly
external to it. 5 According to this theory the elements of a crime are: (1)
The act: (2) Its circumstances; (3) Its consequences; (4) The mental ele-
ment.-6 This view has not, however, been adopted in this article; and the
term "act" is here used as a shorthand method of expression37 which includes
33Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed., p. 382; Yale Law Journal, vol. 26, p. 647 per Cook.
34Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed., p. 383; Yale Law Journal, vol. 26, p. 647; Keeton,
Jurisprudence. p. 155. Indeed, the act in question may be further analyzed. Between the pull-
ing of the trigger and the falling of the hammer there is the releasing of the spring which
brings down the hammer; between the releasing of the spring and its actual recoil intervene an
infinite number of molecular movements in the body of the spring; and between the striking of
the hammer and the ignition of the powder there is another series of molecular movements and
chemical changes in the fulminating compound.
35Austin, Jurisprudence, 5th ed., p. 415; Markley. Elements of Law, 6th ed., sec. 215;
Holmes, The Common Law, p. 91; Hibbert, Jurisprudence, pp. 163, 167; Jenks, New Jurisprud-
ence, p. 195; Restatement of Torts, vol. 1, sec. 2. Stroud exhibits some confusion of thought
as to the meaning of the term act. Mens Rea, p. 2.
86The actor's state of mind with reference to the circumstances and consequences. Yale
Law Journal, vol. 26, p. 647.
37"A harmless convenience of language and compendious thinking." Pollock, Jurispru-
dence, p. 158. "It seems convenient to group them under the term act." Hibbert, Jurispru-
dence, p. 163. For another and unusual meaning which has been given to the term act, see
Harvard Law Review, vol. 9, p. 84; vol. 16, p. 493.
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not only the origin of the act but also its circumstances and consequences.
For this use there is abundant authoritysB
In ordinary speech we habitually include all material and relevant circum-
stances and consequences under the term act. The act of murder is the shoot-
ing and killing of the victim, and not merely the muscular contractions by
which this result is effected; 39 and the necessity, in legal discussion, of includ-
ing within the term "act" some of the consequences of bodily movement is dem-
onstrated by the cases relative to the action of trespass. The direct damage
sufficient to sustain an action of trespass by no means always follows directly
upon a bodily movement. A number of clearly distinguishable consequences
usually intervene, and it is only by including these consequences in the content
of the term "act" that the damage can be said to be a direct consequence of
the "act." Trespass could be maintained for the damage caused in the case
set forth on page 99, but many consequences intervened between the bodily
movement of the defendant and the ultimate damage
0
VOLITION
Bodily activity or passivity constitutes the origin of an act only if it is
voluntary, or willed. An act involves "a voluntary muscular contraction,""4
-- "a muscular movement that is willed." 2  An act therefore has two elements
-- an internal determination and an external manifestation of it.4 3 It "imparts
intention in a certain sense." It is a muscular contraction and something
more. The contraction must be willed. It is a willed, and therefore intend-
ed, muscular contraction.- But the intention necessarily imparted by an
3STerry, Anglo-American Law, sec. 86; Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed., p. 384; Yale Law
Journal, vol. 26, p. 647; Randal v. R. R., 169 Ala. 614, 53 So. 918. "The criminal act is clear-
ly the whole crime, i. e., the movements as well as the consequences in the external world,
which series of events all taken together are alleged to constitute a crime." West Virginia
Law Review, vol. 2, p. 308.
3 5
Pollock, Jurisprudence, p. 148; Jenks, New Jurisprudence, p. 195.
'°Terry, Anglo-American Law, sec. 407. But in these cases the term "act" does not in-
clude all of the relevant and material consequences. See Harvard Law Review, vol. 9, p. 84.
It is difficult to reconcile the meaning attached to the term act in popular speech with the
maxim that a person is responsible for the natural consequences of his acts---"a maxim which
shows that the law distinguishes between an act and its consequences." Hibbert, Jurispru-
dence, p. 167. Bentham calls the muscular movement an act, and an act plus its consequences,
"action." Principles, Ch. 8, sec. 2. But in common usage the terms are synonymous.
4
'Holmes, The Common Law, p. 91.
'2Yae Law Journal, vol. 26, p. 647. "An act is a voluntary movement of the body."
Stroud, Mens Rea. p. 1. "An act is always the result of a determination of the will which sets
in motion the muscles in order to produce that motion as a consequence, even if no other con-
sequence is desired." Keencr Sclections on Jurisprudence, p. 165. quoting Markley
4'Robinson Jurisprudence sec. 136; Terry, Anglo-American Law. -ec, 77: HIlland Juris-
prudence. 9th ed. p. 100.
44Holmes, The Common Law, p. 54; Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol. 8, p. 433;
Keener, Selections on Jurisprudence, p. 165.
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"act" refers only to the origin of an act and does not extend to its circum-
stances or consequences."
The doctrine is expressed by saying that volition is an essential element
of an act. An act is a bodily movement caused by a volition. A volition is
a desire for a bodily movement which is immediately followed by that move-
ment. 46 There are bodily movements which are not capable of being pro-
duced in accordance with a will to produce them, and therefore are not acts.
The sphere of the operation of volitions is limited and not all bodily move-
ments which are capable of being produced in accordance with a will to pro-
duce them are acts. The movements of the stomach in digesting or the
beating of the heart cannot be produced or accelerated by mere volition, by
directly willing them. If a person wishes to produce these effects, he can do
so indirectly by putting food in his stomach or placing himself in an exciting
situation. But the wish is not a volition, and the movements are not acts.
7
COMPULSION
A person's objective conduct, his bodily activity or passivity, may fail to
be voluntary and to constitute an act because it is compelled by natural forces
or by human agencies. A common form of compulsion by natural causes is
accident or pure chance, where a person is a passive instrument of physical
forces beyond his control. This may be illustrated by a hypothetical case
given in the old books: "A whips a horse on which B is riding, whereupon
the horse springs out and runs over a child and kills it; this is manslaughter in
A, but misadventure in B.''48 A acted and was therefore responsible. But
B did not act and was therefore not responsible.
Bodily movements resulting from spasms or convulsions are not acts,49
e. g., the convulsive movements of an epileptic.50 "Suppose A is suffering
from locomotor ataxia, and as a symptom of the disease his foot flies out and
strikes C. This is not A's act. Suppose A while tossing in the delirium of
typhoid fever, flings his arm against C. This is not A's act."'51
The state of "automatism" which sometimes arises during sleep is an in-
45Holmes, The Common Law, p. 131; Harvard Law Review, vol. 30, p. 546, per Keedy;
Stephen, History of Criminal Law, vol. 2, p. 112.
4'rHarvard Law Review, vol. 30, p. 546; Markley, jurisprudence, 6th ed., sec. 215; Hib-
bert, jurisprudence, p. 162. "An act is a motion of the body consequent upon volition." Jenk's,
New Jurisprudence, p. 194. "'There cannot be an act without volition." Restatement of Torts,
vol. 1, sec. 2.
47Terry, Anglo-American Law, sec. 78.
481 East P. C. 225; cf. Hawkins P. C. vol. 1, c. 29, sec. 3; Hale P. C., vol. 1, p. 476.
See Gibbons v. Pepper, 1 Ld. Raymond 38 for a similar case in which the rider was held not
to be civilly liable because he had not acted.
49Stroud, Mess Rea, p. 193; Holmes, The Common Law, p. 53.
5ORestatement of Torts, vol. 1, sec. 2.
51Harvard Law Review, vol. 30, p. 547.
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stance of natural compulsion. and movements performed under its influence
are not acts. "'The movements of a man's limbs when he gesticulates in a
troubled dream or walks in his sleep are not acts."" "I do not think it has
ever been suggested that a person who in his sleep sets fire to a house or
caused the death of another would be guilty of arson or murder.' '3
The greatest difficulty in the application of the principle that bodily
movements irresistably compelled by natural causes are not "acts" has arisen
in connection with the form of insanity called "irresistable impulse." The
authorities are divided as to whether a person should be held criminally re-
sponsible for the "consequences" of bodily movements which are due to this
form of insanity;5 4 but the question whether such bodily movements are them-
selves really "acts" has not been frequently considered; and it may be argued
that since such bodily movements are the result of a desire, although an insane
and imperative desire, they are acts, because there is not an absence of voli-
tion, which exists only when the conduct does not depend upon the defen-
dant's desire at all.
Compulsion by human agency, in order to render bodily movements in-
voluntary and therefore not acts, must be so complete as to leave no room for
choice. The bodily activity or passivity must not depend in any degree upon
the wish or desire of the person charged with it. In these cases, as, in the
cases of compulsion by natural causes, "inasmuch as the party is mentally pas-
sive it cannot be said that he acts. " 55 "Suppose B takes A's hand and with it
strikes C. This is clearly not A's act." 58
It has been contended that bodily activity or passivity under the com-
plete control of hypnotic or post hypnotic suggestions are not acts, because
the dominion of the hypnotist over the subject's mind is such as to deprive
the latter of an independent choice of action. But if, as some modern author-
ities assert, the operation of hypnotic or post hypnotic suggestion lies merely
in the impression upon the subject's mind of an urgent or imperative desire re-
sulting in the commission of the suggested conduct, it cannot be denied that
the conduct constitutes an act, whatever may be the rule as to the criminal
responsibility for the consequences of such action.57
It is generally agreed that one cannot be held criminally responsible for
the consequences, whatever they may be, of involuntary activity or passiv-
52Pollock, Jurisprudence, 5th ed., 146.
53Stephen, History of Criminal Law, vol. 2, p. 100.
:416 C. J. 102.
5Austin, Jurisprudence, p. 1060.
06Harvard Law Review, vol. 30, p. 546.
5"Stroud, Mens Rea. p. 257. Because of the exemption from liability which is accorded
to infants in certain cases it has been suggested that the bodily movements by which they in-
flict harm on others are not acts. But infants have the power of volition and do act. Terry,
Anglo-American Law, sec. 79.
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ity.58 But the question has not frequently arisen in actual cases. 9 There is
a conflict of opinion as to whether "irresistable impulse" is a defense in crim-
inal cases; 60 and hypnotic or post hypnotic suggestion has not yet been recog-
nized as a defense.6" It has been specifically held, however, that one is not
responsible for the consequences of his bodily movements resulting from "a
paroxysm of somnolentia or somnambulism. ' '62 In an English case the de-
fendant was accused of shooting with intent to resist arrest. His defense was
that the gun went off accidentally. The court charged the jury that a man
must be taken to intend the natural consequences of his acts, and that it was
for the prisoner to satisfy them that the gun went off accidentally. On ap-
peal the conviction was reversed upon the ground that the direction might
have been understood by the jury as laying down the incorrect proposition
that a person must be taken to intend the consequences, not only of his inten-
tional but also of his accidental acts. 3 Such an understanding could only be
arrived at by a stupid jury, because there are not such things as "accidental
acts." A movement of the body which is purely accidental is not an act at
all.
The exemption from criminal responsibility for the results of involuntary
bodily movements which is, by most authorities, based upon the theory that
without volition there is no act, is, by other authorities, based upon the theory
that volition is a mental element which must accompany the act in order to
constitute a crime." Thus a recent writer states: "Confusion has been in-
troduced into the subject by some writers who have sought to define act in
terms of willed or voluntary muscular activity. Such definitions do not
properly define the word * * the defendant's mental condition
constitutes intent or proves the existence of intent and is not in any sense a
part of the act itself."'6 5
A person who, intentionally or negligently, surrendered his conscious
volitional control over his bodily movements might be held responsible for
results subsequently caused by such movements. But in a case where the
defense claimed the defendant had killed the deceased in a paroxysm of
somnambulism the court said, "If the person is and has been afflicted in the
manner claimed, and knew, as he no doubt did, his propensity to do acts of
6sStephen. History of Criminal Law, vol. 2, p. 100; Jenks, Book of English Law, p. 192.
"Involuntary" used in connection with manslaughter characterizes the consequence of the
bodily movement, death, and not the bodily movement itself. It does not mean that a volition
was not present. State v. McVay. 47 R. I. 292, 132 A. 436.
59Pollock, Jurisprudence, p. 147.
6016 C. J. 102.
s'Stroud, Mens Rea, p. 244.
62Fain v. Com., 78 Ky. 183.
0sftex v. Davies. 29 T. L. R, 350. (1913).
64Harvard Law Review, vol. 30, p. 547.
65Miller, Criminal Law. p. 94.
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violence when aroused from his sleep, he was guilty of a grave breach of
social duty in going to sleep in the public room of a hotel with a deadly
weapon on his person, and merits, for that reckless disregard of the safety of
others, some degree of punishment, but we know of no law under which he
can be punished. Our law only punishes for 6vert acts done by responsible
moral agents. If the prisoner was unconscious when he killed the deceased,
he cannot be punished for that act, and as the mere fact that he had a weapon
on his person and went to sleep with it there did no injury to any one, he can-
not be punished for that."6
INSTINCTIVE ACTS
Some psychologists assert that no hard and fast line can be drawn be-
tween voluntary movements of the body and what are called the reflex move-
ments. Certainly there are some movements of the body as to which it is not
easy to say how far they are the result of volition. For example, if a person,
being suddenly struck at, dodges, as we say, "in-stinctively." ought the move-
ment be considered his act?67
A recent publication asserts that "a muscular reaction is always an act
unless it is a purely reflexive action in which his mind and will have no share.
Thus if A, finding himself about to fall, stretches out his hand to seize some
object, whether a human being or a mere inanimate object, to save himself
from falling, the stretching out of his hand and the grasping of the object is
an act, since the defendant's mind has grasped the situation and has dictated
a muscular contraction which his rapidly formed judgment leads him to be-
lieve to be helpful to prevent his fall. While the decision is formed instan-
taneously, none the less the movement of the hand is a response to the will
exerted by a mind which has already determined upon a distinct course of
action. The exigency in which the defendant is placed, the fact that the
decision corresponds to a universal tendency of mankind, may be enough to
relieve the defendant from liability, but it is not enough to prevent his grasp-
ing the object from being his act.'"'"
The question of criminal responsibility for the consequences of these so-
called instinctive acts has not been frequently considered. There has been
considerable discussion as to civil liability for such acts.6 9 A person who
wrongfully causes another to make these instinctive movements may be held
responsible for the consequences resulting therefrom.70
-Fain v. Com., 78 Ky. 183.
87Mercier, Criminal Responsibility, p. 44.
GSRestatement of Torts, vol. 1, sec. 2.
69Harvard Law Review. vol. 7. p. 302; vol. 8, p. 225; vol. 13, p. 599: Lardlaw v. Sage,
158 N. Y. 73, 52 N. E. 679.
7OTerry. Anglo-American Law, sec. 96.
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SPONTANEOUS ACTION
Bodily movement, in order that it may constitute an act, need not be
"spontaneous,' '-1 It is not necessary that the actor's will should operate
freely and without pressure from outside circumstances. The fact that the
pressure is such that reasonable men cannot be expected to resist does not
prevent its manifestation from being an act, although it may make the act
excusable, The fact that a man is induced by some motive, powerful and
terrible, to will a bodily movement does not render it involuntary and there-
fore not his act. The bodily movements of a criminal who is walking to his
execution are just as much acts as if walking from his place of confinement
to regain his liberty.72 And if B is induced by the blows of A to hit C, the
hitting of C is B's act. This case differs from the case where A by force
takes B's arm and therewith hits C. In the first case B was induced to "will"
and the hitting was his act. In the second case B did not "will" and the hit-
ting was not his act.
73
From the fact that a bodily movement has occurred, an intention that it
should occur may be inferred in absence of evidence to the contrary. "It is
a legal presumption that a person intended to do what he actually did. ' ' 74 The
physical element of most crimes involves more than one bodily movement.
Hardly any crime is committed by performing or omitting a single bodily
movement.7 5 And the same bodily movements may be followed by different
groups of consequences and the question whether the actor may be held
criminally responsible for more than one crime may arise.7" A distinction is
made in common speech between saying and doing-between word and act,
but the speaking of words is an act and may constitute a crime, as, e. g., soli-
citation .7
CONSEQUENCES
All acts are, in respect to their origins, alone indifferent. No bodily
activity or passivity is itself criminal."' All the muscular contractions of a
7iKeeton, jurisprudence, p. 150.
72Stephen, History of Criminal Law, vol. 2, p. 102.
3"Herein lies the difference between physical compulsion and duress." Hibbert, Juris-
prudence, p. 165. "If the movement is caused by physical compulsion, as when the hand of a
person is forcibly guided, there is no act since 'will' is absent. But the will itself being amen-
able to motives, may be coerced by threats, etc. Here there is an act." Holland, Jurispru-
dence, 9th ed., p. 101. Keeton, Jurisprudence, p. 151, "In the second case there was no ap-
peal to conflicting desires." Hibbert, Jurisprudence, p. 169, "In the first case having before
him the choice of two things he chose the least disagreeable alternative." Keener, Jurispru-
dence, p. 176.
74McEIvey v. State, 9 Neb. 157, 2 N. W. 378.
75 Terry, Anglo-American Law, sec. 82, 568. To commit larceny one must take and carry
away. To commit burglary one must break and enter.
16Terry, Anglo-American Law, sec. 569; Com. v. Emeste, 89 Pa. Super. Ct. 102.
77Terry, Anglo-American Law. sec. 81.
79Holmes, The Common Law, p. 54; Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed., p. 383.
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man who shoots another with a pistol, the motions of his arm and hand by
which the pistol is aimed and discharged, would be perfectly lawful if the
actor had not a pistol in his hand, or if no one stood in front of him, or even,
according to some cases, if the pistol was not loaded.,,
Acts are made criminal because of their consequences and these conse-
quences are determined by the circumstances. "An act which in itself is
merely a voluntary muscular contraction, derives all its character from the
consequences which will follow it under the circumstances in which it is
done." The consequences of an act because of which it is made criminal
may be either actual or anticipated. Acts may be criminal because of their
"tendencies or their actual results.
''
82
Crimes may therefore be divided into two classes:
(1) Those in which an act is made criminal by reason of the actual
harm which in fact ensues from it.-
(2) Those in which an act is made criminal by reason of its mis-
chievous tendencies, irrespective of the actual results.8 8
"Criminal liability," it is said, "is usually sufficiently established by proof
of some act which the law deems dangerous in its tendencies, even though the
issue is in fact harmless.'64 "Generally speaking in criminal law acts are
wrongful on account of their tendencies."85 Since the tendencies of an act
are determined by its circumstances, it is sometimes said that acts of the sec-
ond class are made criminal because of their circumstances, and the distinction
is made between acts which are criminal because of their consequences and
those which are made criminal because of their circumstances, 6 but this dis-
tinction overlooks the fact that in all cases the consequences of an act, actual
or anticipated, are determined by its circumstances.9
Bodily activity may be attended by an infinite variety of circumstances
and an endless chain of consequences.8 8 An act has no natural boundaries.
Its limits must be artificially defined for the purpose at hand for the time being.
Out of the array and chain the law therefore selects some, and declares that
bodily activity or passivity, or certain forms thereof, attended by these is
criminal. It is the law which selects the bodily activities and passivities and
the circumstances and consequences with which they must be attended to con-
stitute crimes. "It is for the law at its own good pleasure to select and de-
8OTerry, Anglo-American Law, sec. 110; Abraham Tucker, Light of Nature, ch. 11.
81Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194; Amos, Science of Law, p. 103.
82Keeton, Jurisprudence, p. 156.
83Salmond, Jurisprudence, p. 156.
84Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed., p. 385.
8sKeeton, Jurisprudence, p. 156.
88Harvard Law Review, vol. 41, p. 838; Jenks, New Jurisprudence, p. 195.
8 Yale Law Journal, vol. 40, p. 53.
gaKeeton, Jurisprudence, p. 156.
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fine the relevant and material facts of each species of crime. ' ' 9  The circum-
stances and consequences so selected and defined are the constituent parts of
the criminal act. All others are irrelevant and without legal significance.
Thus in larceny the hour of the day is irrelevant, but in burglary it is
material. 90
OMISSIONS
The criminal act may be either positive or negative-an act of commis-
sion or acts of omission.-' Acts of omission, being purely negative, can only
be described by describing the acts of commission which are omitted.92 By
some authorities the term act is used in a narrow sense to include only posi-
tive acts, and then it is opposed to omissions and does not include them.9s
This restriction is inconvenient. Adopting the generic sense, acts can be de-
scribed as positive or negative, but if the term is restricted to acts of commis-
sion, there is no name for the genus and an enumeration of species is neces-
sary.
9 '
Acts of omission are sometimes called negligence.9 But this is incor-
rect. Negligence relates to the mental part of crime. Omission, on the
contrary, concerns the physical part of crime. An omission may be either
intentional or negligent, just as a positive act, or act of commission, may be
either intentional or negligent. s An omission may be due to passivity or to
acts inconsistent with the act omitted.97  In the 'latter case, the inconsistent
act may be committed prior to or coincident with the omission. These dis-
tinctions may be of importance in considering the mental element of crime. 98
The term omission is sometimes confined to unintentional negative acts.
89Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed., p. 383.
OOKeeton, Jurisprudence, p. 156. "The outward act which enters into the composition of
crime is the subject of innumerable statutes and innumerable judicial decisions. Criminal acts
have been classified and considered with the utmost minuteness and most discriminating subtlety,
as to their kinds, their effects, their stages, their circumstances, and I know not what besides.
The other ingredient of crime-the state of mind which accompanies the outward act-is much
more obscure; and, though it has received much attention at the hands of very eminent men, it
has not reached a stage of such settled determination as has the first ingredient." Mercier,
Criminal Responsibility, p. 3.
9'Holland, Jurisprudence; State v. O'Brien. 32 N. J. L. 169.
O2Terry, Anglo-American Law, sec. 110.
93Stroud, Mens Rea, p. 4; Randle v. Birmingham, 169 Ala. 614, 53 So. 918; Keeton, Juris-
prudence, p. 151.
94Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed., p. 381.
95The word negligence is derived from shirking one's duty in the harvest field.
96California Law Review, vol. 7, p. 431; Salmond Jurisprudence, 7th ed., pp. 382, 421.
97"When a party omits he may have taken either one of two courses-i. e., he may do
nothing at all or he may do something different from the act he is omitting to do." Hibbert,
Jurisprudence, p. 165.
OSStroud, Mens Rea, p. 5.
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It is then opposed to forbearances which are intentional negative acts.99 A
forbearance, it is said, is the determination of the will not to act. It is omis-
sion together with advertence to the act which is not done and a determina-
tion not to do it,-0 It is a conscious advertence to a particular course of
action and a conscious refusal to adopt it; and an omission implies inadver-
tence with regard to a given course of action and a consequent, but uncon-
scious, failure to adopt it.101
The theory upon which forbearances are made criminal is obvious. For-
bearances are intentional omissions. Intention is the result of deliberation on
motives, and the threats of the criminal law furnish potential forbearers a
powerful motive to do rather than to refrain from doing the proper thing.
Omissions are made criminal upon the theory that the threats of the law stim-
ulate the mind to greater alertness or the memory to greater activity, than it
would otherwise display, and thus reduces the number of omissions. It must
be left to the psychologists to decide whether this is true or not.
Inaction due to physical compulsion is not an act of omission.10 2  Thus
if A is locked in a room so that he cannot get out he does not "omit" to come
out. But if the door is open and he refrains from coming out because he is
threatened with harm if he does come out, his not coming out is an act of
omission. The ordinary doctrines relative to the mental element of crimes
apply to crimes by omission according to the character of the crime in ques-
tion and the circumstances of each case. 103 The consequences of an omission
may be intended or unintended, expected or unexpected, and the circumstances
of the omission may be known or unknown, and the criminal responsibility in
the particular case may, as in the case of acts of commission, depend upon
these facts. 1°4
CRIMES OF OMISSION
When it is said that the criminal act may be positive or negative, it is not
meant that every crime may consist of either a positive or negative act. The
99Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed., p. 382; Keeton, Jurisprudence, p. 150; Hibbert, Juris-
prudence, p. 160.
100Keener, Jurisprudence, p. 169; Terry, Anglo-American Law, sec. 83; Keeton, Juris-
prudence, p. 150. A forbearance is sometimes called a wilful neglect which is a contradiction
in terms, for in case of neglect there is no intention. Hibbert, Jurisprudence, p. 181.
50Jenks, New Jurisprudence, p. 206; Robinson, Jurisprudence, sec. 136. It is not clear
whether the intention necessarily involved in a forbearance relates to the bodily inaction or to
the consequences thereof. "The consequences of a forbearance may be desired or not desired,
expected or not expected, adverted to or not adverted to." Keener, Jurisprudence, p. 169. "If
I fail to keep an appointment through forgetfulness my act is unintentional and negative; that
is to say, an omission, But, if I remember the appointment and resolve not to keep it, my act
is intentional and negative; that is to say, a forbearance." Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed.,
p. 382.
102Hibbert, Jurisprudence, p. 166.
1osStroud, Mens Rea, p. 156.
104Keener, Jurisprudence, p. 169; Terry, Anglo-American Law, sec. 83.
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perpetration of some crimes requires a positive act; the perpetration of others
requires a negative act; and some crimes may be perpetrated by either posi-
tive- or negative acts,
The great majority of crimes require acts of commission. 10 5 Although
the number of crimes by omission has increased greatly in recent years, they
are still comparatively few in number.106 The law does not require active
benevolence between man and man. It is left to one's conscience whether he
shall be a good Samaritan or not.107 "Thus, not to remove your neighbor's
baby from the railroad track in front of an on-rushing train, although it would
cause you very little trouble to do so, is no crime even if the child's life is lost
as a result of your neglect. You can let your mother-in-law choke to death
without sending for a doctor, or permit a ruffian half your size to kill an old
and helpless man, or allow your neighbor's house to burn down, he and his
family sleeping peacefully in it, while you play the pianola and refuse to call
up the fire department, and never have to suffer for it-in this world."'108
It is chiefly by reason of its failure to .impose affirmative duties and to
make the failure to perform these duties crimes, that the criminal law differs
from morality; and it is perhaps debatable whether inaction in the face of
manifest danger to another should not be made criminal.
It seems, however, that the law in strictly limiting affirmative duties, and
consequently crimes of omission, has adopted a prudent course. If every one
were bound to act when another was exposed to danger, the consequences re-
sulting from officious and mistaken inference would probably be worse than
those which result from the operation of the present law. The practical dif-
ficulty in framing laws to impose affirmative duties to be benevolent would
also be very great. The difficulty would be in drawing the line. A possible
working rule might be that one who fails to interfere to save another from
impending death or great bodily harm when he might do so with little or no
inconvenience to himself, and death or great bodily harm follows as a con-
sequence of this inaction, shall be guilty of a crime. 09 Bentham contended
that every man is bound to assist those who have need of assistance if it can
be done without exposing himself to sensible inconvenience and that this obli-
gation was stronger in proportion as the danger is greater for the one and
3OSGeldart, Elements of English Law, p. 193: Jenks. Book of English Law, p. 193.
i°oOdgers. Common Law of England. p. 106; West Virginia Law Review, vol. 40, p. 387;
Com. v. Cali., 247 Mass. 20. 141 N. E. 510. See Stroud, Mens Rea, p. 155.
107Ames, Essay on Legal History. p. 451.
'"°Train, The Prisoner at the Bar, p. 450. "Omissions were probably punished in early
times by the primitive tribunals of the village. guild, or manor. But until recent times it was
rare for the state to punish directly the offense of mere omission." Jenks, New Jurisprudence,
p. 207. "For many centuries, English law, like all primitive systems concerns itself mainly, if
not exclusively, with acts of commission." Jenks, Book of English Law, p. 193. Holdsworth,
History of English Law, vol. 2, p. 51.
l09Ames, Essays on Legal History, p. 451.
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the trouble of preserving him the less for the other.110 The Dutch Penal
Code provides: One who witnessing the death with which another is threat-
ened neglects to give or furnish him such assistance as he can give or procure
without reasonable fear of danger to himself or others if the death of the
person in distress follows.' shall be responsible.
A distinction must be made between mere acts of omission and omissions
in the course of or preceded by affirmative action. 112 The immediate cause of
an injury may have been an act of omission but if it is connected with active
conduct in this way, the whole course of conduct may be considered as having
caused the injury.-3  The distinction between a mere omission and an omis-
sion in the course of affirmative action is "most pregnant." "If a surgeon
from benevolence cuts the umbilical cord of a new born child he cannot stop
there and watch the patient bleed to death. It would be murder wilfully to
allow death to come to pass in that way."" " A person who fails to look for
pedestrians while driving an automobile and as a result hits and kills one
commits manslaughter by affirmative action." 5 The tendency to consider
omissions as active misfeasance has been carried to extremes." 6 Thus a re-
cent writer says: "On the whole, it may be said that duties to take positive
action for the benefit and protection of others attach only to certain relations,
and are imposed only when necessary to afford protection. Even in case of
family relationship, there is present the will of the citizen to become a husband
and father, so that even here the relation is, in the last analysis, a creature of
voluntary action on his part.'
'
11
Acts of omission have sometimes been held sufficient to render a person
guilty of a crime although the law defining the crime seemed to require an act
of commission. Thus an owner of an automobile who knew that his car, in
which he was riding but not driving, had struck a dog, and who made no
effort to have his car stopped to give aid to the suffering animal is guilty of
the offense defined in a statute which provides that, "any one who shall want-
only or cruelly ill treat or otherwise abuse any animal shall be subject to fine
or imprisonment." The court said that "such a person certainly wantonly
and cruelly abuses an animal in a common sense and humane interpretation
of the statute. Ill treatment and abuse does not need to be active; it may
11Works, vol. 1, p. 164. See also Livingston. Works on Criminal Jurisprudence. vol. 2,
p. 126.
"-Article 450.
"12West Virginia Law Review, vol. 40. p. 388.
"5 Stroud. Mens Rea. pp. 163, 165.
"14Holmes, The Common Law, p. 278.
"SJenks, Book of English Law, p. 195.
"6GWest Virginia Law Review. vol. 40, p. 388.
117Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts. p. 318.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
be passive. It does not need to be the commission of an act; it may be an
omission to do what the circumstances require."' s
ACTS CONSTITUTING SEVERAL CRIMES
Acts which are similar in some respects may constitute different crimes
because:
(I) They are different in other respects.
(2) They are accompanied by a different mental element.
(3) They are prohibited by different systems of law.
Acts which are similar in their origins may constitute different crimes
because their consequences or tendencies are different. Thus an unlawful
blow struck at another may fail to reach him and constitute an assault; or
reach and constitute a battery; or destroy a limb and constitute mayhem; or
cause death and constitute homicide. And shooting at a person in a private
room is an assault; in a public place, a breach of peace; in the presence of the
court, a contempt. 119
Acts which are in all respects similar may constitute different crimes be-
cause of difference in the mental element with which they are accompanied.
This difference may be either in the intent or in the motive. Every act may
give rise to two questions with respect to the mental attitude of the actor.
The first is: How did he do the act, intentionally or not? The second is:
If he did it intentionally, why did he do it? The purpose of the actor to do
an act is the intent and his purpose in doing it is his motive.
The act of hitting one on the head with an axe and killing him is murder
in the first degree if the actor intended to kill, but is only murder in the second
degree if the actor intended merely to inflict great bodily harm. The differ-
ence in the intent renders the acts different crimes. The act of breaking and
entering a dwelling house in the night time is burglary if the reason for doing
it was the desire to commit a felony, but is at most a misdemeanor if the rea-
son was something else. The difference in the motives renders the acts dif-
ferent crimes.
Acts which are similar may constitute different crimes because they are
prohibited by different systems of law. In the United States an act may be
prohibited by: (1) federal law. (2) state law, and (3) municipal ordinance
and be punished as a crime by the nation, the state, and the municipality, and
an act so prohibited constitutes different crimes even though all three laws
designate it by the same name. 20
11Corn. v. Putch, 18 D. 6 C. 680. This was a case of omission preceded by an affirma-
tive act. But see Com. v. Call., 247 Mass. 20. 141 N. E. 510.
SloThe difference here is in the anticipated consequences, or tendencies, but these depend
upon the circumstances.
12016 C. J. 62.
